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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TITLE III
SHOULD PRIVACY INTERESTS YIELD
IN THE WAKE OF
CONGRESSIONAL
SILENCE ON ENTRIES TO INSTALL BUGS?

-

In 1968 Congress enacted an elaborate statute' regulating law enforcement officials' use of electronic surveillance to overhear conversations of
those suspected of crimes.2 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968' details precisely the officials who may apply for4
and issue 5 an eavesdropping 6 warrant, the factual circumstances in which

a warrant may be issued,7 the contents of the application8 and warrant, 9
the manner in which intercepted conversations' ° are to be recorded and
preserved, 1 ' and the manner in which suppression issues are to be liti-

1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
2. Electronic surveillance and eavesdropping are used in this paper to refer to the interception of conversations by wiretapping ("the interception of telephone calls") or bugging
("the use of hidden microphones to pick up all conversations in a given area") without the
consent of one party to the conversation. See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law
Enforcement: Hearings on S 2050 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 983 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings] (quoting N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1966, § A, at 24, col. 7).
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
were guides for Title III which was intended to provide law enforcement officials with tools
to fight organized crime. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-76, reprinted in [1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2153-63.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
4. Id § 2516.
5. Id.§§ 2510, 2516.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976).
8. Id.§ 2518(1).
9. Id § 2518(4).
10. Seizure and interception are used interchangeably in this paper to refer to the "aural
acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976). For a definition of oral
and wire communications, see note 14 infra. There may be, however, a real difference between a search and an interception of conversations. As distinguished from a conventional
search and seizure, where all items in a premises are not brought into an officer's custody,
electronic surveillance may require officers to overhear all conversations. See note 2 supra.
In Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 101, 338 A.2d 284, 291-92 (1975), the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that listening to but not recording a conversation does not constitute an interception. See generally C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING §§ 6, 7 (1978).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (1976).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:697

gated.' 2 However, Title III is silent on: whether law enforcement officials
may enter to install eavesdropping devices which have been authorized;
whether such entry must be authorized by the judge authorizing the interceptions; whether the application must set forth the need for such entry;
and whether the judge must authorize the number, time, and manner of
such entries. This statutory silence and the sparse commentary in the legislative debates on the entry problem inevitably resulted in judicial confusion and disagreement.
Title III has been variously interpreted by seven United States courts of
appeals. Not only has there been disagreement on whether entries to install are permitted but also, assuming entries are permitted, on whether
such entries must be expressly authorized by court order. Recently, the
United States Supreme Court, in Dalia v. United States, 3 resolved this
conflict among the circuits by ruling that authorization for the interception
of oral communications 4 implicitly authorizes, without further scrutiny,
entries necessary to effectuate a bug. This Note will analyze the Court's
opinion in Dalia and its potential impact on individual liberties and on
law enforcement procedures.
I.

TITLE

III

AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures strikes a balance between individual liberties and societal protection. 5 All searches and seizures must be reasonable, and search warrants
generally must be obtained prior to the intrusion. Warrants are only is12. Id §§ 2515, 2518.

13. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
14. Oral communication is defined as "any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1976). Oral communications
are distinct from wire communications which are made using transmission facilities aided by
"wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception." Id § 2510(1).
15. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (fourth amendment requires a balancing of the need to search or seize against the invasion which such
search or seizure entails). The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The fourth amendment protects an individual's right to be let alone and to be free from
general searches. See Hufstedler, Indivisible Searches For Tangible Things. Regulation Of
Governmental Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1512-14, 1516-23 (1979)
(electronic surveillance, by its nature, is most intrusive, and the costs of allowing this investigative technique may outweigh any benefits derived). For a discussion of individual rights

1980]

JudicialInterpretationof Title III

sued by a judge after the judge concludes there is probable cause to believe
that the search will uncover fruits or instrumentalities of a crime.' 6 Furthermore, law enforcement officials seeking a warrant must particularly
describe the place to be searched and the people or things to be seized.' 7
8
There are, however, a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement.'
For example, evidence found in plain view during a lawful search of the
premises may be seized even though the warrant does not specifically describe the evidence.' 9
Historically, the interception of oral communications when unaccompanied by a physical trespass was excluded from fourth amendment protection.2" However, in 1967, the Supreme Court, in Berger v. New York, 2
held a New York electronic surveillance statute unconstitutional because it
lacked fourth amendment particularity requirements. Subsequently, in

and eavesdropping, see Note, Eavesdropping Ordersand the FourthAmendment, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 355, 372 (1966).

16. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-78 (1949) (probable cause constitutes sufficient circumstances to convince a reasonable person that an offense is being committed and that a search is necessary to uncover evidence of the crime).
Electronic surveillance applications should be carefully drafted, setting forth sufficient
facts to establish probable cause. For an example of an application which failed to establish
probable cause, see People v. Brown, 80 Misc. 2d 777, 779-81, 364 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367-69
(Sup. Ct. 1975).
17. See 1 J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 393-408 (2d ed. 1974), for a
discussion of the particularity requirement.
18. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
19. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-72 (1971) (car in plain view
seized without a warrant; evidence suppressed for lack of inadvertence). For plain view
evidence to be admitted, the officers must be lawfully on the premises, the evidence must
have been in plain view, and the officers must have come upon the evidence inadvertently.
Id. The inadvertence requirement, however, is open to interpretation. In United States v.
Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979), the court ruled that officers have inadvertently
seized objects when they do not have probable cause to believe that the seized evidence
would be found. However, in In re 2029 Hering Street, Bronx, N.Y., 464 F. Supp. 164, 16869 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court held the seizure was not inadvertent where officials had a
strong belief that items other than those mentioned in the warrant would be found and were
found.
In addition to plain view, exceptions to the warrant requirement have been granted under
a variety of circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
(border search); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (search during hot pursuit);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent search); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to an arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (search during a stop and frisk).
20. For a discussion of the trespass doctrine, see notes 33-36 and accompanying text
infra.
21. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). For a discussion of Berger, see notes 40-43 and accompanying
text infra.
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Katz v. United States,22 the Supreme Court, in a broad decision, ruled that
conversations are protected by the fourth amendment even if their seizure
is unaccompanied by a physical trespass.
Responding to Berger and Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to regulate electronic
surveillance by the government for law enforcement purposes. To obtain
an eavesdropping warrant, Title III requires law enforcement officials to
particularly describe: the place to be bugged or the telephone to be
tapped; the person(s), if known, whose communications are to be seized;
the type of communication to be seized; and the offense which has been, is
23
being, or will be committed.
The standard of probable cause required for eavesdropping warrants is
identical to that required for other search warrants. 24 This standard, however, is applied for different purposes resulting in important differences in
the application processes and in the warrants themselves.2 5 For example,
probable cause to eavesdrop does not indicate a corresponding probable
cause to search. 26 Thus, one may have probable cause to believe that a
telephone is being used to further a crime but lack probable cause to believe that physical evidence will be found on the premises. Additionally,
while a showing of probable cause must be made for each search, an
eavesdropping warrant may authorize repeated searches for up to thirty
days. 27 A further difference lies in the application process: whereas many
law enforcement officials may request a search warrant 28 only an attorney
general, a specially designated assistant attorney general, or the principal
attorney of a state or subdivision thereof may authorize an application for
an eavesdropping warrant. 29 This process centralizes responsibility in a
designated public official.3" Moreover, whereas any neutral magistrate
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a discussion of Katz, see notes 37-39 and accompanying
text infra.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(I) (1976). Berger has been cited as a "constitutional blueprint" of
what an electronic surveillance statute should look like. See Hearings,supra note 2, at 97378.
24. See United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931
(1978). For sample descriptions of places, persons, types of communications to be seized,
and crimes alleged, see FISHMAN, supra note 10, §§ 51, 58, 61, 66, 67.
25. See United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
955 (1975).
26. See United States v. Fino, 478 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,417 U.S. 918
(1974).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). See generally C. FISHMAN, supra note 10, § 6.
28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976).
30. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515-20 (1974).
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may issue a search warrant, 3 1 only judges
of competent jurisdiction may
32
authorize an eavesdropping warrant.
Although Title III details precisely the limits of government interception, neither the statutory language nor its legislative history specify
whether officials may enter to install bugging equipment and, if so,
whether such entries must receive prior judicial approval.
4. Pre-Title III Eavesdropping
In the years preceeding the enactment of Title III, warrantless interceptions accomplished without physical intrusion did not violate an individual's fourth amendment rights. This rule, termed the "trespass" doctrine,33
was announced in Olmstead v. United States,34 a wiretapping case, and
later applied in Goldman v. United States,35 a bugging case. In Olmstead
and Goldman, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment was not
violated because there were no "physical" intrusions in the course of performing the surveillances. As recently as 1961, the Court adhered to the
where a warrantless entry
trespass doctrine, ruling evidence inadmissible
36
was made to install a bugging device.
Forty years after Olmstead, the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United
States,37 expressly rejected the trespass doctrine. In Katz, federal agents
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a).
32. A judge of competent jurisdiction is defined as "a judge of a United States district
court or a United States court of appeals; and a judge of any court of general criminal
jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing
interceptions of wire or oral communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9) (1976).
33. Under the trespass doctrine, a person's fourth amendment rights are not violated
"unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his
papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466
(1928). There are two distinct intrusions referred to in Oimstead: seizure of tangible evidence; and physical trespass. The seizure problem was at issue in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), where the Court ruled that the fourth amendment protects
against overhearing oral conversations resulting from an unlawful trespass. In Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court rejected the rule that there must be a physical
trespass. For a discussion of Katz, see notes 37-39 and accompanying text infra.
34. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
35. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
36. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506-12 (1961). In Silverman, agents,
without obtaining a warrant to enter or to bug, drove a spike mike into a wall the petitioner
shared with an adjoining house and monitored his conversations. In suppressing the evidence, the Supreme Court focused on the warrantless physical intrusion rather than the
warrantless seizure of conversations. Id Implicit in Silverman is recognition that intangible
conversations can be seized. See NATIONAL WIRETAP COMM'N, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE REPORT 37 (1976).

37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Katz decision was foreshadowed by Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead, where he identified the invasion of an individual's right to personal secur-
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proceeding without a warrant placed a bug on the outside of a phone
booth frequently used by the petitioner to transmit wagering information." The Supreme Court ruled that even though there had been no trespass, the failure to obtain judicial authorization to intercept the
communications required suppression of the evidence, notwithstanding the
fact that there was probable cause to bug and that the bugging was reasoncommunicaably effectuated. Thus, Katz established that a person's oral 39
tions are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures.
In a narrowly circumscribed decision, the Supreme Court, in Berger v.
New York,4" struck down a New York eavesdropping statute because it
lacked the fourth amendment's particularity requirements. In a six-tothree decision, the Court found the statute unconstitutional because it
failed to require applicants to state the alleged crime, the place to be
searched, and the type of conversation to be seized. 4 In Berger, the
Supreme Court set out criteria necessary to bring the New York statute in
line with constitutional requirements.4 2 Absent from these criteria, however, is a requirement for specific judicial authorization to enter and install
bugging devices.4 3
B. JudicialResponse to Title I
Title III's legislative history indicates congressional awareness of the
need for entry. Congressional debates, however, never directly addressed
ity as the essence of the fourth amendment violation. 277 U.S. at 474-75. Between Olmstead
and the Berger and Katz decisions came Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). In
Osborn upon the informer's consent to the recording of his conversation with petitioner, the
agents, after showing probable cause, received judicial authorization to record the informer's
conversation. The Katz Court reiterated that the Osborn procedure would satisfy the fourth
amendment requirements. 389 U.S. at 355. Confusion may result from the Court's reliance
on Osborn which involved consensual recording. See Dash, Katz - Variations on a Theme
by Berger, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 296, 310-13 (1968).
38. 389 U.S. at 348, 354 n.14. Law enforcement officials overheard only Katz's part of
the conversations. Id at 354.
39. Id. at 351. Katz was the perfect vehicle for the Supreme Court to announce unequivocally that it is the person, not the area, which receives constitutional protection. In
Katz, the Court did not have to deal with physical invasions into an area since the bug was
placed on the outside of the phone booth. Furthermore, the Court noted that the surveillance was reasonably executed. But the failure to obtain a warrant necessitated suppression
of the evidence. Id at 354-59.
40. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
41. Id at 54-59.
42. For a comparison of the Berger requirements and the corresponding Title III sections, see McNamara, The Problem Of SurreptitiousEntry To Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops.- How Do You Proceed.4fterThe Court Says "Yes"?, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1,6 (1977).
43. In Berger, the Supreme Court was aware that entries had been made in effectuating
the bug, but it did not address this issue. See 388 U.S. at 45.
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whether entry to install with or without specific judicial authorization
would be permissible." In the wake of litigation on the entry issue under
Title III, three conflicting theories have been advanced by the federal
courts of appeals: entries are not permitted;4 5 entries are permitted provided there is prior "express" judicial approval to enter;46 and entries are
47
"implicitly" authorized in an order to bug.
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits are the most recent federal appellate
courts to address the entry issue. In United v. Finazzo48 and UnitedStates
v.' Santora,49 these circuits held that, absent express authorization in Title
III, no entries are permissible."0 In Finazzo, agents neither sought nor received judicial permission to enter the defendant's offices to install microphones.5 The Sixth Circuit held that the entry violated property and
privacy interests distinct from those affected by the search and seizure of
communications.5 2 A more complex situation was addressed by the Ninth
44. 114 CONG. REC. 14,484 (1968). Senator McClellan remarked that "[w]e tried to
pattern this legislation after what the Supreme Court said in the Berger and Katz decisions."
Id See also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 224-25, reprintedin [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2153, 2274.
During the debates, Senator Tydings stated that Title III would not result in wholesale use
of electronic surveillance for a number of reasons. One such reason being that "[b]ugs are
difficult to install in many places since surreptitious entry is often impossible. Often, more
than one entry is necessary to adjust equipment." 114 CONG. REC. 12,989 (1968). Senator
Morse stated that bugging, as distinguished from wiretapping, requires an intrusion upon
private premises to install. 114 CONG. REC. 11,598 (1968). See also 114 CONG. REC. 14,732
(1968) (remarks of Senator Yarborough).
45. See notes 48-54 and accompanying text infra.
46. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text infra. Where there has been express authorization for the entries, courts have looked to sources in addition to Title III to justify the
entries. See, e.g., United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 698-701 (8th Cir. 1976) (the "No
Knock" Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976), allows entries). Agrusa involved entries into a
business premise to install a bug and was specifically limited to its facts. Although § 3109
requires a knock and announcement prior to entry, the court stated that the need for secretive entry presented an exigent circumstance, allowing agents to enter without the prescribed
knock and announcement. See also United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837, 851-52 (6th Cir.
1978) (Celebrezze, J., concurring) (FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a) (1976), should be used to empower judges to authorize entries).
47. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra.
48. 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated andremanded,441 U.S. 929 (1979) (vacated in
light of Dalia).
49. 583 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated andremanded,441 U.S. 939 (1979) (vacated in
light of Dalia), rev'd 600 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979).
50. If the Dalia Court had followed the reasoning of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits or
Justice Stevens' dissent in Dalia, criminals might safely conduct their affairs in buildings not
susceptible to nontrespassory eavesdropping. See notes 63-74 and accompanying text infra.
See also In re United States, 563 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1977).
51. However, a diagram indicating where the microphones were to be hidden was attached to the application for the interception order. 583 F.2d at 840.
52. Id The court rejected the government's.contention that the interception order im-
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Circuit in a case involving an interception order which expressly authorized entry. 3 However, the court, in United States v. Santora, refused to
interpret Title III's silence as evidence of congressional intent to permit
surreptitious entry. The court noted that the precise language in Title III
precluded a holding that surreptitious entries to install were permitted by
implication.54
An alternative to the Finazzo and Santora approach was taken by the
Fourth Circuit in In re United States." There, the court ruled that entry
was contemplated by Congress under Title III, but that entry will be valid
only if pursuant to specific judicial authorization to enter. 6 Adhering to
this approach, the District of Columbia Circuit, in UnitedStates v. Ford,5 7
the
held that a judge must authorize the installation entry and specify
8
discretion.1
agent's
executing
the
to
little
manner of entry, leaving
Expanding upon the rulings of other circuits, the Second and Third Circuits, in United States v. Scafidi5 9 and UnitedStates v. Dalia6 ° respectively,
held that an interception order complying with Title III implicitly authorizes entry. The Scafidi court ruled that once the authorizing judge is convinced that the oral interceptions are necessary, the agents have the
plicitly authorized the entries, finding that, since the power to break and enter was not defined by the statute, it would be unwise implicitly to create a new exception to general search
and seizure principles. 1d at 840-46.
53. See United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d at 454. The court discounted references by
Senators Tydings and Morse, indicating congressional awareness that entries to install might
be necessary. Id at 461-62. Instead, in support of its holding the court quoted Senator
McClellan's statement that "a bill as controversial as this. . . requires close attention to the
Id. at 457 (quoting 114 CONG. REC.
dotting of every 'i' and the crossing of every 'T.
14,751 (1968)).
54. 583 F.2d at 458.
55. 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977).
56. Id. at 642-45. The court also rejected the lower court ruling that compelling or
paramount justification is required before the entries may be authorized. Id. at 644.
57. 553 F.2d 146, 152-55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
58. Ford has been criticized as requiring the judge to specify the exact time and manner
of entry, thereby depriving law enforcement officials of necessary flexibility. See McNamara, supra note 42, at 14-15. However, while Ford requires specificity in the warrant, the
court did not take away all of the agents' discretion. The court implied that agents might be
given freedom to make multiple entries at any time, in any manner, if affidavits supporting
the application indicate that such freedom is necessary. See 553 F.2d at 169-70. Furthermore, under Title III, agents may, in exceptional circumstances, perform the surveillance
and then obtain judicial authorization after the fact. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976).
59. 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,436 U.S. 903 (1978). In the court's view, it
would have been "highly naive" to impute to the issuing judge a belief that the bugging
authorization did not include authorization to enter and install. Id at 640. Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow, however, since bugs may be effectuated without entering.
See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
60. 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), a'd,441 U.S. 238 (1979).
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authority to carry out the "mechanics" of the operation.6" The Third Circuit also adhered to the "mechanics" theory in its analysis of Dalia,6 2 a
case involving a covert entry to install bugging equipment.
II.

DA LIA V UNITED STATES: THE MECHANICS THEORY PREVAILS

In April, 1973, at the request of federal agents, Federal District Court
Judge Frederick Lacey authorized the interception of oral communications
at the- business office of Lawrence Dalia. The order did not expressly authorize the agents to enter and implant a bugging device, nor did the
agents apprise Judge Lacey of the contemplated entries.6 3 Pursuant to the
interception order, federal agents surreptitiously entered the petitioner's
office and implanted the bug.64 In the subsequent trial, Judge Lacey admitted evidence from this bug over the petitioner's objection that the entry
to implant the bug was an unlawful search and seizure in violation of his
fourth amendment rights.65 Judge Lacey ruled that the entry to install was
merely a mechanical aspect of the surveillance, implicitly authorized in the
Title III order to bug.66 Thus, once probable cause in support of an order
authorizing the surveillance is shown, entries may be made. The Third
Circuit upheld the conviction, following the lower court's rationale. But
the appellate court indicated that, in the future, the preferred approach
would be for agents to state in their application that entries, if contemplated, are necessary.6 7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the questions of
whether Title III permits installation entries and whether a bugging order

61. See 564 F.2d at 639-40.
62. See 575 F.2d at 1346. See also United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D.
Md. 1976), a]/'dsub nom. on other grounds, United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978) (entries of business premises without authorization to
install a bug resulted in no greater intrusion than the interceptions themselves).
63. Judge Lacey never discussed installation of the bug with the agents or the supervising attorney. 575 F.2d at 1346 n.3.
64. Id at 1345.
65. United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 863-64 (D.N.J. 1977). Petitioner, Lawrence Dalia, was convicted of crimes relating to theft and possession of an interstate shipment of textiles.
66. Judge Lacey, who issued the order to bug and conducted the subsequent trial in
which evidence obtained from the bug was admitted, found that "the safest and most successful method of accomplishing the installation of the wiretapping (sic] device was through
breaking and entering the premises in question." 426 F. Supp. at 866. The court apparently
confused wiretapping with bugging, since in Dalia the surveillance technique used was bugging. For a comparison of bugging and wiretapping, see note 2 supra.
67. 575 F.2d at 1346-47.
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implicitly authorizes such entries.6" Affirming the rulings below, the
Supreme Court held that an order authorizing the interception of oral
communications implicitly authorizes entries to install the bug. 69 The
Court's analysis began with a review of Title III's legislative history to
determine whether the Act empowered judges to authorize entries to install bugging equipment. Noting that Title III was enacted to meet the
Berger and Katz requirements and that there were few remarks in the
legislative debates concerning entries, the Court concluded that Congress
must not have viewed such entries as significant.7" Justice Powell, writing
for the majority, found installation entry to be simply a matter which can
be left to the executing agents' discretion. The Court reasoned that since
the government had satisfied the express requirements of the fourth
amendment - that the interception order be based on probable cause
"supported by an Oath or affirmation" and particularly describing the petitioner's office and the conversations to be seized - entries to install were
thereby authorized.7"
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that no entries to install should be
allowed absent express judicial or legislative sanction.7 2 In the instant situation, he noted that, although the order sanctioned the bugging, it did not
describe the "kind" of equipment to be used or the entry. Justice Stevens
reasoned that until Congress grants authorization to enter, the courts
should protect individual liberties by proscribing general warrants which
allow trespass on private property without legislative or judicial sanction.73
Writing a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that entries
involve constitutional rights to privacy distinct from nontrespassory inter68. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Dalia v. United States, 439 U.S. 817 (1979)
(opinion granting certiorari).
69. 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979).
70. Id. at 251. Also, the Court relied on congressional comments indicating an awareness that entries to install might be necessary. Id. at 250-52. According to Professor Blakey,
one of the drafters of Title III, the Court properly interpreted Title III. See Wash. Post,
Apr. 19, 1979, § A, at 18, col. 4.
71. 441 U.S. at 254-59. For a discussion of the standards of review for bugging and for
other searches, see notes 24-32 and accompanying text supra.
72. 441 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in
Justice Stevens' dissent. Justice Stevens stated that because Title III was carefully drafted,
congressional silence on the entry issue should not be read as granting authority to enter.
Id. at 264-66. This interpretation of the statute recognizes that Congress may well have
intended to permit law enforcement officials to install bugging devices only in situations not
requiring actual entry as in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (bug on outside of
telephone booth), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (detectaphone placed
on exterior of wall).
73. 441 U.S. at 267-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens maintained that Congress, not the courts, should legislate, particularly when liberties are involved. Id
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ceptions. In his view, intrusions should be limited to those set forth in the
warrant. Although details of the surveillance may be left to the executing
agents' discretion, entries which involve distinct constitutional privacy
rights should not be equated with the mere mechanics of the operation.7 4
Thus, it is clear that the majority in Dalia views a bugging order as
implicitly authorizing entry. Nevertheless, by failing to require specific judicial authorization for entries, the Supreme Court has created another
exception to the warrant requirement.
III. D4LIA'S IMPACT ON FOURTH AMENDMENT SAFEGUARDS
A. The Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court's holding in Dalia closely parallels its earlier decisions in Berger and Katz delineating the limits of electronic surveillance
by the government.7 5 Like the Katz and Berger Courts, the majority in
Dalia focused on the reasonableness of the search and seizure of conversations, rather than the unauthorized physical trespass.76 Viewing Title III
to be Congress' response to Berger and Katz, the Court interpreted the
statute to emphasize the object of the search rather than the method of
effectuating the search because Congress apparently "did not find it significant that Berger involved a covert entry, whereas Katz did not."77 Thus,
the Court construed Title III as implicitly authorizing entries to install.
After determining that Title III permitted entries to install, the Court
then considered whether express authorization to enter was constitutionally mandated. The Court reasoned that the fourth amendment's probable
cause and particularity requirements, as well as judicial authorization for
the entries, were fulfilled by the judge issuing the bugging order; to require
separate judicial review of the entries would be an "empty formalism 78'
Thus, separate evaluations of the need for the surveillance and the entry
are no longer necessary; the issuing judge's evaluation of the need7 9 for the
74. Id at 260 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Brennan argued that an
impartial judge should decide whether invasion of a distinct constitutional right is permissible. Id at 261.
75. See notes 37-43 and accompanying text supra.
76. See 441 U.S. at 257-58.
77. Id at 251.
78. Id. at 258. But see id at 259-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued
that requiring express judicial authorization prevents unreasonable government intrusions.
Id. For a discussion of the standards of review for bugging and for other searches, see notes
24-32 and accompanying text supra.
79. Necessity to enter does not refer to absolute necessity, but rather to necessity in the
practical sense. See In re United States, 563 F.2d 637, 644-45 (4th Cir. 1977) (necessity
requirement is flexible, requiring only a showing that the entries are reasonably necessary).
Compare United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
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surveillance will suffice.8" However, the Court acknowledged that, although entries are not subject to prior specific authorization, they would be
subject to a post hoc review for reasonableness.8 1 Such a test, however,
does not prevent unreasonable entries, it only requires after-the-fact suppression of evidence obtained through unreasonable entries. Thus, the
majority in Dalia overlooks the fourth amendment protection of an individual's "right to be let alone" 82 and allows warrantless entries onto private premises to install bugging devices.
Apart from its impact as an exception to the warrant requirement, Dalia
has a number of significant practical consequences for fourth amendment
rights. Potentially, entries to bug may bring law enforcement officials into
contact with plain view evidence." Recognizing this possibility, Judge
930 (1978) (although agents failed to eliminate the possibility of physical surveillance, the
court ruled that all conceivable techniques need not be eliminated before applying for wiretap) and United States v. Robertson, 504 F.2d 289, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 913 (1975) (necessity requirement met where alternative physical surveillance techniques would have been costly and inconvenient) with United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d
585, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1975) (affidavits inadequate for failure to allege facts showing why
particular case necessitated wiretap). This lesser showing of necessity corresponds to the
Title III alternative technique provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c), (3)(c) (1976) (application must show, and judge must determine, that normal investigative procedures reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed).
The Dalia Court did not accept petitioner's argument that the entry was unnecessary and
therefore unreasonable. The Court noted that the lower court judge had found normal investigative procedures unlikely to succeed. 441 U.S. at 248 n.8. See also notes 89-91 and
accompanying text infra.
80. 441 U.S. at 258. The Fourth Circuit in In re UnitedStates adopted a bifurcated test
for reviewing the entries and the interceptions. See 563 F.2d at 644; notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra. The Dalia Court rejected bifurcation, ruling that once the surveillance
is authorized, the entries used to effectuate the surveillance are implicitly authorized. 441
U.S. at 258. See general 24 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 142-43 (1977).
81. See 441 U.S. at 258. Once surveillance is completed, a judge reviews the operation
to determine whether the techniques used satisfy the fourth amendment's reasonableness
requirements. Whether an operation is reasonable may turn on whether only reasonably
necessary intrusions were employed. In United States v. Volpe, 430 F. Supp. 931, 947 (D.
Conn. 1977), aff'dmem., 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir. 1978), agents had entered premises to install
a bug although installation could have been effectuated without entering by placing the bug
on a telephone pole. The district court rejected the defendant's argument that the surveillance could have been effectuated without an entry as merely a speculative hindsight argument since it relied on facts not present when the application was made. For a discussion of
the post hoc reasonableness test, see notes 89-94 and accompanying text infra.
82. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
83. The Title III provision allowing conversations relating to crimes other than those
mentioned in the interception order to be seized is analogous to the plain view doctrine. See
18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1976). See also United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 680-81 (10th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972) (interception application related to narcotics violations; conversations relating to a bank robbery were admitted in evidence). For a critical
analysis of the "plain view" doctrine as applied to intangibles, see Project, Subsequent Use
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Gurfein, concurring in United States v. Scafidi,s4 indicated that if any
plain view evidence is uncovered while the bug is being installed, such
evidence must be suppressed. In contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Ford,5 indicated that the plain view doctrine may
allow agents to seize evidence discovered during the installation entry.
However, because seizure of tangible property may reveal the surveillance,
such seizures are likely to be rare so long as the value of the evidence
sought by the bug outweighs the value of the tangible plain view evidence.
Yet, it is not inconceivable that agents without probable cause for a conventional search warrant might apply for and receive a warrant to bug. 6
Following Dalia, such agents would be authorized to enter and, in the
course of installation, might stumble upon tangible evidence. All that is
necessary for such tangible evidence to be admissible is a lawful entry, and
an inadvertent seizure of property in plain view.87
A more disturbing possibility arises when agents do not have probable
cause to obtain a warrant to seize tangible evidence but enter under a bugging order with the knowledge that tangible evidence is likely to be seen.
Failing to seize under the plain view doctrine, agents might carry out the
electronic surveillance and later apply for a conventional search warrant.
Probable cause to support the warrant originally lacking might then be
satisfied with knowledge acquired during the installation entry. 8 In this
way, both the tangible and intangible evidence could be seized.
B. Post Hoc Assessment of Reasonableness
The Dalia Court ruled that in keeping with fourth amendment safeguards, execution of an eavesdropping warrant is subject to post hoc judicial review for reasonableness. The Court, however, provided little
Of Electronic Surveillance InterceptionsAnd The Plain View Doctrine: Fourth Amendment
Limitations On The Omnibus Crime ControlAct, 9 U. MicHi. J.L. REF. 529 (1976).

84. 564 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J., concurring).
85. 553 F.2d 146, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
86. See notes 24-32 and accompanying text supra for a comparison of the probable
cause requirement for a search warrant with that for an eavesdropping warrant.
87. See note 19 supra for a discussion of the plain view requirements.
88. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at 158,

165 n.58. In Ford, the surveillance and the entries were both expressly authorized. However, the issuing judge neither limited the time nor the manner of the entries. Pursuant to
this unlimited authorization, agents entered twice by using bomb scare ruses and implanted
the bugs. The court ruled that the entries aggravated the surveillance. 553 F.2d at 153-55.
In Irvine, overzealous police entered the petitioner's premises and implanted microphones in
the bedroom and later in the bedroom closet. The Court viewed this surveillance as particularly intrusive. 347 U.S. at 132. Both Irvine and Ford illustrate the problems associated
with leaving the entries to an agent's discretion.
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guidance on the proper standard to be applied. The majority merely indicated that the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement may be satisfied if the bug effectuated by entry is the safest and most successful
investigative method available.89 Title III, however, does offer courts
some guidance on the reasonableness of using electronic surveillance in
lieu of less intrusive investigative methods that, by analogy, may prove
helpful. Pursuant to sections 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c) of Title III, electronic
surveillance techniques may be used when other investigative techniques
reasonably appear unlikely to succeed or too dangerous to attempt. 90
Thus, courts might deem eavesdropping warrant executions that include
surreptitious entries to install to be reasonable when other methods of
eavesdropping'would be ineffective or dangerous.
Technological advances in electronic surveillance pose additional difficulties in applying the post hoc reasonableness test suggested in Dalia. Today, law enforcement officials have numerous tools available to perform
electronic surveillance without entering, 9 ' although not all law enforcement agencies own the most technologically advanced equipment. Where
equipment permitting the execution of the warrant without entry is available but expensive, the question may arise as to whether the post hoc test
of reasonableness requires law enforcement agencies to purchase such
equipment in order to protect an individual's right to be let alone.9 2
Prior to Dalia, the Justice Department, addressing the issue of the reasonableness of entry, implemented procedures requiring officials to notify
the issuing judge of any entries contemplated when they apply for the warrant. 93 However, since the Justice Department procedure is supported
89. See 441 U.S. at 248 n.8, 258.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(I)(c), (3)(c) (1976). See note 79 supra.
91. Parabolic, shotgun, and other directional microphones focus on sound vibrations
coming from a single direction. Contact, spike and pneumatic microphones, as well as lasers, convert window and wall vibrations into electronic signals. Although these devices are
useful in a variety of applications, they cannot be used to intercept conversations in an inner
room of a building. Furthermore, transmission problems caused by the layout of the premises and background interference may make the use of such devices impractical. For these
reasons, law enforcement officials may prefer a trespassory bug for optimum service and
reception. See NATIONAL WIRETAP COMM'N, COMM'N STUDIES 171-72, 179-83 (1976). See
also A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 75-77, 132 (1970).
92. But see United States v. Robertson, 504 F.2d 289, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975). In Robertson, the court ruled that a wiretap was not unnecessary
even though less intrusive physical surveillance was viable. The rationale behind the holding was that the physical surveillance would have been costly and inconvenient. Thus, it is
questionable whether courts will require law enforcement agencies to purchase advanced
equipment.
93. See Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 6, Dalia v.
United States, 439 U.S. 817 (1979) (opinion granting certiorari).
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neither by case law nor by statute, Dalia may encourage officials to overlook the procedures. In addition, although several states have enacted legislation requiring a judge to expressly authorize entries to install,9 4 in those
states where no express authorization is required only the post hoc test for
reasonableness protects individual rights. Consequently, subsequent to
Dalia, this post hoc standard has become the first line of defense against
unreasonable entries.
IV.

THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Because entries to install eavesdropping equipment involve serious intrusions into an individual's privacy, the federal and state governments
should enact legislation similar to that already enacted in several states to
fill the vacuum in Title III regarding entries to install. Such legislation
should require officials to show that a particular surveillance plus entry is
reasonable and necessary. Officials should not be required to show an absolute necessity to enter, 95 however, as such an approach might seriously
hamper effective law enforcement by requiring all other investigative techniques to be tried before a trespassory bug is authorized. 96
New legislation regulating entry to install should contain a number of
provisions to protect individual privacy interests. First, the time and manner of each entry should be approved by a judge who may authorize both
the bug and the entry in the same document. 97 Where prior approval for
the entries is impracticable, a report on the need for the entry should be
submitted to the judge within forty-eight hours of the entry for a determination of necessity and reasonableness.98 In such cases, the judge should
94. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-41e(l0) (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §
99(F)(2)(g) (West 1968); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.30(8) (McKinney 1971). The New
York statute requires "express authorization to make a secret entry upon a private place or
premises to install an eavesdropping device, if such entry is necessary to execute the warrant." Id
95. For a discussion advocating the least intrusive method, see 57 B.U.L. REV. 587, 60006 (1977). For a discussion of the "practical and commonsense" test mentioned in Title III's
legislative history regarding the interceptions, see S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
repriniedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2190.
96. The "least intrusive method" test may result in a more intrusive surveillance in
some situations since, for example, wiretaps, nontrespassory bugs, and trespassory bugs
would have to be attempted in that order. Thus, surveillance for a period longer than necessary using a trespassory bug may result. Senator Morse argued that electronic surveillance
which does not require a physical intrusion is the most insidious and should not be tolerated
at all. See 114 CONG. REC. 11,598 (1968).
97. See United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 695-96 n.II (8th Cir. 1976).
98. This requirement would parallel the Title III provision allowing agents to use electronic surveillance in exigent circumstances, but requiring agents to report its use to the
judge within 48 hours of execution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976).
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be empowered to stop the surveillance and to suppress all evidence obtained through the bug if the entry is deemed unreasonable. This procedure will transfer much of the decisionmaking power from the executing
agents to the issuing judge yet will allow reasonable emergency entries.
Second, to minimize police-citizen confrontations, entries should be allowed only when premises are empty. Such a practice will not only diminish the potential for physical harm to individuals but will also protect an
individual's right to be let alone.
Third, plain view evidence should be admitted only where agents had
no knowledge prior to entry that the plain view evidence seized was likely
to have been found. This procedure will minimize the possibility that
agents might use a trespassory bug when less intrusive techniques could
have been used. 99 Also, where agents are aware that the plain view evidence might be found during the installation entry but are unable to obtain a search warrant, knowledge acquired during the entry should not be
used to establish probable cause for a subsequent search."° If enacted,
these measures would provide agents with flexibility in choosing the technique to be used and effectively balance the individual costs of surreptitious entry with the benefits to law enforcement efforts.
V.

CONCLUSION

So long as Dalia remains law, agents need not obtain express authorization for installation entries when obtaining an eavesdropping warrant.
The unfortunate results of Dalia are tempered on the federal level by the
Justice Department policy requiring officials to state in electronic surveillance applications whether entries are contemplated. However, only a few
states have similar policies. Because trespassory bugs intrude upon privacy interests distinct from the interests affected by the interceptions themselves, a procedure requiring express authorization for entry should be
required. Legislation calling for prior judicial approval for entries to install will minimize law enforcement officials' incentive to enter with hopes
of finding other evidence and will protect personal security.
William Steven Oshinsky

99. See note 91 supra.
100. See notes 83-88 and accompanying text supra.

